Hernandez v. New York
17 Analyses of this case by attorneys
Capital Defense Weekly, July 24 , 2000
Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 24, 2000
The defendant at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the existence of purposeful discrimination.See, e.g.,id.at 93;Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.In reviewing a trial court's decision concerning the presence of intentional discrimination, it is essential that we accord that decision the deference required by law.See, e.g.,Hernandez v. New York,500 U.S. 352, 364(1991) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.");Batson,476 U.S. at 98n.21 ("[A] finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court."
Capital Defense Weekly, July 23 , 2000
Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 23, 2000
The defendant at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the existence of purposeful discrimination.See, e.g.,id.at 93;Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.In reviewing a trial court's decision concerning the presence of intentional discrimination, it is essential that we accord that decision the deference required by law.See, e.g.,Hernandez v. New York,500 U.S. 352, 364(1991) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.");Batson,476 U.S. at 98n.21 ("[A] finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court."
Capital Defense Weekly, January 26, 2004
Capital Defense NewsletterJanuary 25, 2004
We have explained that,independent of the strength of the evidence tendered as a prima facie case, once a prosecutor attempts to explain a peremptory challenge, we believe the trial and reviewing courts should look to the entire record to determine if intentional discrimination is present. If the prosecutor's explanation raises more concern than it puts to rest, courts cannot effectively close their eyes to that fact by simply deciding that the defendant has not made out a prima facie case.United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1156 (1989); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.").
Capital Defense Weekly, March 3, 2003
Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 3, 2003
BSince Miller-El’s claim rests on a Batson violation, resolution of his COA application requires a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the three-step framework mandated by Batson and reaffirmed in our later precedents. E.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion). Contrary to the state trial court’s ruling on remand, the State now concedes that petitioner, Miller-El, satisfied step one: “[T]here is no dispute that Miller-El presented a prima facie claim” that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude venire members on the basis of race.
Capital Defense Weekly, March 2, 1998
Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 2, 1998
Dissent argues that under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion), & Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the unredacted confession should have been admitted as the standard is degree of moral culpability not whether Howard would still be death eligible with the unredacted statement.(3 )On the final, non-confession, issue addressed on the merits, state court findings are conclusive on the issue of whether prosecutors stuck veniree on the basis of race in light of its interpretation of the Supreme Courts holding in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991) (plurality, "a pure issue of fact, subject to review under a deferential standard" )CAPITAL CASES REVIEWEDMalone v. Vasquez Panel holds that failure of Petitioner to verify his state post-conviction application is an independent and adequate state ground to deny relief on numerous claims, thus under rules of procedural default, all issues held defaulted, save a specious ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. Addressing on the merits the two claims the dissent, the court holds race was not used as the basis of removing jurors under Batson relying on both state court findings of fact and its own (alleged) review of the record.
Jury Selection - Batson v. Kentucky
Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C.Don SamuelSeptember 1, 2015
The trial court must then proceed to the next step and determine whether, considering the prima facie case and the explanation offered by the party who exercised the strike, the opponent of the strike carried his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination.J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994)Batson applies to peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of gender.Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)Batson applies to defense strikes, as well. The defendant’s exercise of peremptory strikes amounts to state action and the exercise of those strikes against jurors based on their race violates those jurors’ constitutional rights.Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)The prosecutor excused two Hispanics and explained that he excused them because they were bilingual and was fearful that they would not listen to the interpreter who would be translating witnesses who spoke Spanish. This was not a violation of Batson.
State Law Barring Racial Preferences in Admissions
California Department of Fair Employment and HousingApril 22, 2014
(d)HunterandSeattlealso endorse a version of the proposition that a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a disparate racial impact. That equal-protection theory has been squarely and soundly rejected by an "unwavering line of cases" holding "that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires state action motivated by discriminatory intent,"Hernandezv.New York, 500 U. S. 352, 372-373 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), and that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact,"Arlington Heightsv.Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264-265. Respondents cannot prove that the action here reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, for any law expressly requiring state actors to afford all persons equal protection of the laws does not-cannot-deny "to any person . . . equal protection of the laws," U. S. Const., Amdt.
TPR – Admission Procedure
Wisconsin State Public DefenderJanuary 11, 2012
The trial court, it bears repeating, ruled that Roseannah had met her (purely procedural) burden of showing a prima facie case of a defective admission. In an arguably analogous situation – whether a defendant challenging jury selection has made a prima facie case for discrimination so as to shift the burden to the prosecution, the United States Supreme Court has observed, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion):The prosecutor defended his use of peremptory strikes without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court. As a result, the trial court had no occasion to rule that petitioner had or had not made a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination.
Peremptory challenges
Law Office of Phillip CavePhillip D. CaveMarch 31, 2009
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant may not exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror solely on the basis of the juror’s gender, ethnic origin, or race. See, e.g., J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (ethnic origin); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race).United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U. S. at 315 (emphasis added).
Plea-Withdrawal, Post-sentence: Prima Facie Showing, Plea Questionnaire
Wisconsin State Public DefenderFebruary 13, 2008
If this procedural issue hasn’t previously arisen in a Bangert setting, it has, underBatson; State v. George Melvin Taylor,2004 WI App 81, ¶ 23 n. 5, holds thatonce a neutral explanation has been offered, “and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion); State v. King, 215 Wis. 2d 295, 303, 572 N.W.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1997). As such, an explicit trial court finding that a prima facie case had been established is not necessary for this court to evaluate the rest of the analysis.
